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Execut ive Summary 
& key findings
Populations that lack convenient and affordable access to savings and credit are often described as 
“unbanked.” The micro-finance movement has succeeded in providing the previously unbanked with 
access to credit. However, the influence of micro-finance has been uneven and incomplete, with many 
variations in the degree of access to financial services. Those who are marginally worse off are still in 
need of a way to manage their money.
One model that fills this gap is the VSLA/SILC. These are savings groups in which members meet regularly 
and must contribute a minimum savings amount at each meeting. This money goes into a loan pool and is 
lent out to members, ideally so that each member receives at least one loan per year. Loans typically must 
be repaid, with interest, in one to three months, thus returning cash to, and enlarging, the pool. At the end 
of the annual cycle the pool is disbursed, each member’s share corresponding to the amount of savings 
they have put in.
In addition to providing an accessible savings and loan vehicle, the VSLA/SILC model goes beyond 
conventional banking by including a system of social support. The group structure encourages and 
promotes positive saving habits among members. In addition, members contribute to a separate social 
welfare fund that can be drawn on to cover emergency costs during times of need, such as illness or death.
We studied VSLA/SILC savings groups in Uganda that were established in multi-year projects by two 
facilitating agencies, CARE and Catholic Relief Services (CRS). Project funding phased out completely in 
2012, but savings groups continue to spring up, or “replicate.” The Datu Research team conducted field 
research in Uganda in May–July 2013 and collected data through surveys and focus group discussions 
with replicated groups and the original project groups. The data gathered enabled us to estimate the rate 
of replication. It also provided a sense of how the experience of replicated groups compared with that of 
project groups.
This report synthesizes the data gathered, addressing the following core questions:
1. What is the estimated rate at which project groups are replicating?
2. Why and how do replicated groups form?
3. How does the performance of replicated groups compare with that of project groups? 
4. What do members of replicated groups report about their experience?
5. What does membership in multiple groups tell us about replication and the VSLA/SILC model?
Our data collected from 20 project groups and 46 replicated groups produced the following 
key findings:
wE DOCUMEnTED THE EXiSTEnCE Of 1.99 REPliCATED gROUPS, On AvERAgE, fOR EACH 
PROjECT gROUP. Overall, replicated groups appeared to uphold the core features of the VSLA/SILC 
model, with small adjustments tailored to the needs of members. A major factor in replication appears 
to be the phenomenon of membership in multiple groups; nearly all groups had at least one member 
who also participated in at least one other group. Some members belonged to as many as five groups. 
Membership in multiple groups shows people’s enthusiasm for joining savings groups and their desire 
1
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to maximize the associated benefits. The rapid expansion of the phenomenon raises questions, 
however, about whether the VSLA/SILC model enables members to meet their expectations via 
membership in only one group.
AMOng REPliCATED gROUPS, MORE wERE SElf-fORMED (25) THAn fORMED wiTH THE 
HElP Of An AgEnT (15). Members mainly got the idea to start a replicated group by observing, 
and interacting with, existing groups. For technical knowledge and support, they turned in 
nearly equal measure to existing groups and to agents who were trained by the original project. 
Interestingly, nearly half of self-formed groups eventually used agent services after they formed. 
Of these, 70% paid the agent, a rate twice that of agent-formed groups (33%). This suggests that 
groups who were approached by an agent offering a service may have been less willing to pay for 
it than groups that actively sought it out. Overall, members chose to join a replicated group for 
three main motives: to pay immediate and recurring costs (such as school fees), to invest in future 
returns (such as buying an asset or starting a business), and to obtain specific services (such as 
taking out loans or earning interest on savings). Members also cited social benefits of joining 
such as networking and engaging in a system of social support.
REPliCATED gROUPS PERfORMED SiMilARly TO PROjECT gROUPS, wiTH SOME 
DiffEREnCES THAT ARE wORTHy Of fURTHER STUDy. Replicated groups showed a higher 
rate of return on savings (35%) compared with project groups (30%). However, replicated groups 
also offered smaller loans and were less likely to achieve 100% loan access (where every member 
received a loan in the most recent complete cycle). More research is needed to explain conclusively 
why, despite these other performance factors, replicated groups appeared to have a higher return on 
savings. As for loan repayment, replicated groups appeared to show a higher default rate, although 
this finding also merits further study. Groups’ reporting may have been affected by variations in 
the definitions of delinquency and default. For example, the VSLA/SILC model enables a member 
to use his or her share-out to repay an outstanding loan from the same savings cycle—an important 
feature that gives the borrower flexibility and protects the group against default. Since this study 
design does not specifically capture each case in which a delinquent loan was repaid from the 
borrower’s share-out, it may inadvertently overstate rates of default.
MEMBERS Of REPliCATED gROUPS REPORTED MAjOR BEnEfiTS AnD EXPRESSED 
BROAD SATiSfACTiOn wiTH SAving, BORROwing, AnD PURCHASing ASSETS. 
HOwEvER, A fEw EXAMPlES Of UnwiSE DECiSiOn MAking SUggEST THE nEED 
fOR OngOing TRAining. Members in most replicated groups (85%) said they had learned or 
improved their savings habits through membership in VSLAs or SILCs. In nearly half of replicated 
groups, members credited the group directly with teaching them how to save. Share-outs were 
most commonly used for investments (63%), particularly in livestock and land. Loans were most 
often used to fund immediate needs such as school fees (53%). Specific comments about saving 
and borrowing raised a concern that some members of replicated groups may be making financial 
decisions not consistent with the model’s intent. For example, 22% of groups had members 
who reported having sold assets to meet their savings requirement, a dynamic that, if involving 
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productive assets, could indicate a misunderstanding of financial concepts. Similarly, two groups 
reported that members took loans from one group to meet the saving requirements in another. 
These individual decisions highlight the need for further study to determine whether members of 
replicated groups are receiving adequate training in vital concepts of financial literacy.
fURTHER RESEARCH iS nEEDED On THE PHEnOMEnOn Of MEMBERSHiP in 
MUlTiPlE gROUPS AnD iTS iMPliCATiOnS fOR THE vSlA/SilC MODEl. Membership in 
multiple groups (MMG)1 was higher among replicated groups (56%) than project groups (47%). 
Members’ responses indicate that many of those who joined more than one group had saving 
and borrowing needs that could not be met by membership in a single group. Our data suggest 
that relatively prosperous members may join multiple groups to maximize their saving and 
borrowing. We found no indication that MMG in itself has negative effects for savings groups 
or their members. However, our data indicate that some members have taken out loans to pay 
off debt to other groups. This shifting of debt from group to group could potentially enable a 
borrower to enter a cycle of debt that the VSLA/SILC model is designed to protect against—
within any one savings group. The potential debt shifting made possible by the phenomenon of 
membership in multiple groups, by contrast, merits further research.
Our data indicate that savings groups have replicated rapidly, and that overall, they have 
provided substantial benefits and fulfilled members’ desires to “grow” their money. Members’ 
impressions of the model and stories of its effects on their lives were strikingly positive. Overall, 
the model has helped members learn to save, buy assets, start businesses, cope with emergencies, 
and take care of their families. Further study is needed to assess the role of agents and to 
document the effects of training on groups’ performance. Additional research is recommended 
to determine to what degree the financial literacy component of the model is extending to 
replicated groups.
1 
MMg reflects the number of individuals 
within a group that were concurrently 
members of more than one vSlA/SilC 
group at the time of data collection.
5
D A T U R E S E A R C H . C O M   
6
P O S T - P R O j E C T  R E P l i C A T i O n  O f  S A v i n g S  g R O U P S  i n  U g A n D Aw i l D l i f E  T O U R i S M  A n D  T H E g U l f  C O A S T  E C n O M y
D A T U R E S E A R C H . C O M
7
P O S T - P R O j E C T  R E P l i C A T i O n  O f  S A v i n g S  g R O U P S  i n  U g A n D A
in troduct ion
A prominent explanation for the persistence of global poverty suggests that poor populations 
lack convenient and affordable access to a range of financing tools, including savings, credit, and 
insurance opportunities (Hendricks, 2011). These populations are often described as “un-bankable” 
because of their remote location, lack of credit history, and limited access to financial services.
To counteract the barriers that restrict access of poorer populations to traditional forms of financing, 
the micro-finance movement seeks to supply rural, impoverished populations with access to credit. 
Micro-finance institutions (MFIs), often for-profit institutions, offer micro-credit opportunities to the 
poor through loans using non-traditional collateral. Today, MFIs invest almost US$8 billion in the 
form of micro-loans in sub-Saharan Africa alone (MIX Market, 2012). However, the reach of current 
MFIs has been limited to the marginally better off, or “entrepreneurial poor”(CARE, 2011). The 
emphasis on credit and high rates of interest has cut out a number of clients and limited the scope 
of development goals MFIs can achieve (Hendricks, 2011). Consequently, savings groups (SGs) have 
been identified to fill these gaps.
Village savings and loans associations (VSLAs) and savings and internal lending communities (SILCs) 
are two SG models, advanced by CARE International and Catholic Relief Services (CRS), respectively. 
In both VSLAs and SILCs, members bring their savings contributions to regular meetings where 
the money is added to a fund managed by the group. Loans are issued to members from this fund, 
allowing interest to accrue and the fund to increase over time. At the end of a pre-determined cycle, 
the entire fund is distributed among the members and a new cycle begins (CARE, 2011; Vanmeenen, 
2011). Members also make weekly contributions to a separate emergency fund from which they can 
make withdrawals in times of need. Through weekly meetings where members can encourage and 
reinforce one another’s positive saving behavior, the VSLA/SILC model provides a social component 
that conventional banking lacks.
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funded the Savings Groups Information Exchange (SAVIX), 
www.savingsgroups.com, to track the performance of more than 150 SG projects in 22 countries over a 
four-year period beginning in 2010, including VSLA and SILC projects in Uganda. However, what is not 
being tracked is “replication”—the tendency of donor-funded SG projects to give rise to additional, or 
“replicated,” groups once a project ends. This study will examine replicated savings groups in Uganda.
In May-July 2013, Datu Research visited 19 villages in seven districts of Uganda, where we met with 
project groups and additional groups that we found met the criteria of “replicated.” We used surveys 
and focus group discussions to gather quantitative and qualitative data.
This report addresses the following questions:
1. What is the estimated rate at which project groups are replicating?
2. Why and how do replicated groups form?
3. How does the performance of replicated groups compare with that of project groups?
4. What do members of replicated groups report about their experience?
5. What does membership in multiple groups tell us about replication and the VSLA/SILC model?
We conclude with a discussion of implications and recommendations for further research.
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Approach to  Data Col lect ion
Our study focuses on how savings groups that were established by CARE and CRS are 
continuing to replicate in Ugandan villages well into 2013, although project funding and 
support was phased out between 2010 and 2012. We define “replicated” groups as those 
that formed after formal project funding for group development had ended. We began by 
randomly selecting “project” groups from each agency—10 from CARE and 10 from CRS—to 
form our sample of 20 project groups. Of these 20, we found that four were no longer active, 
leaving us with 16 “active” groups and four “disbanded” groups.2 Members from the executive 
committees of all 20 groups agreed to complete our survey. Figure 1 shows the locations of 
the project groups in 19 villages spanning seven districts.3 Also indicated are the geographic 
areas where CARE groups and CRS groups were respectively concentrated.
In May–July 2013, a team of Datu researchers visited the 19 study villages. In each, we 
began by asking community members to identify additional savings groups in their village. 
We then met with the sample project groups and other savings groups identified by the 
community, carrying out detailed surveys with each. With community-identified groups that 
met the definition of “replicated,” we followed up the survey with focus group discussions 
to better understand the circumstances under which they had formed, and to document their 
experiences since formation.
Uganda
CARE Areas
CRS Areas
KAMPALA
TORORO
LIRA
BUNDIBUGYO
KASESE
KAMWENGE
ISHAKA
KAGADI
Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Kenya
South Sudan
Rwanda
Tanzania f i g U R E  1 . 
Map of study areas
3%
Drop pins represent 
sample project groups; 
colors indicate district
2 
See the Study Methods and 
Statistical Considerations Appendix 
for more information on disbanded 
groups.
3 
Two project groups were located in 
Magoro village. All other villages 
in this study contained only one 
project group.
Bundibugyo
kibaale
lira
Tororo   
kamwenge 
Bushenyi
kasese
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wHAT iS THE ESTiMATED RATE AT wHiCH PROjECT gROUPS ARE 
BEing REPliCATED?
 key findings
	 •		 The	rate	of	replication	was	1.99	replicated	groups,	on	average,	per	project	group.	
  The range across villages was 0–7.8. Over 20% of villages had a rate of replication 
  higher than 3.5.
	 •		 Membership	in	Multiple	Groups	(MMG)	is	a	key	factor	in	replication.	Other	factors	
  include high weekly savings, high starting membership levels, and high value of 
  first share-out.
	 •		 MMG	complicates	any	attempt	to	estimate	saturation.
RATE Of REPliCATiOn
To estimate a rate of group replication, we first needed to establish a difference between 
“project” groups and “replicated” groups. We define project groups as those formed during 
formal funding for group development under the CARE and CRS projects. Replicated groups 
are those formed after formal project funding for group development had ended. Using the 
community-identified approach, we identified 84 replicated groups. Of those 84, we were able 
to meet and hold focus group discussions with 46.
Figure 2 shows for every project group, this study found, on average, between 1.99 and 2.30 
replicated groups.4 This replication estimate is corroborated by the findings of a small Kenya 
study by Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya that found approximately 2 additional 
groups had formed for every project group (FSD Kenya, 2011). We estimated the replication rate 
by dividing the total number of community-identified replicated groups by the total number of 
community-identified project groups. The higher calculation, 2.30 replicated groups per project 
group, represents the raw output of our method. The lower end, 1.99 replicated groups per 
project group, assumes a margin of error of 15.5%.5 This report uses the low-end replication 
figures in its analysis of replication.
f i g U R E  2 . 
Estimates and 
definitions of group 
replication
4 
The total number of project and 
replicated groups here is drawn 
from the community-identified 
list. This list includes the 20 
sample project groups and the 46 
replicated groups that participated 
in focus group discussions, but also 
includes a larger pool of groups 
identified but not surveyed by the 
Datu team on site in Uganda.
5 
This margin of error represents 
the percent of the time researchers 
changed the initial group 
classification (project or replicated) 
based on additional or updated 
information revealed through focus 
group discussions. Because it was 
not possible to meet with every 
group on the community-identified 
groups list, the calculated margin 
of error was used as a proxy for 
total margin of error.
2 . 3 0 1 . 9 9
R E P l i C AT i O n
( n a t u ra l )
R E P l i C AT i O n
( A d j u s t e d )
Ratio of community-
identified replicated groups 
to project, no proxy
Ratio of community-
identified replicated groups 
to project groups, adjusted 
using a proxy to estimate 
how often replicated groups 
may have been misidentified
R E P l i C A T i O n  R A T E
R E P l i C A T i O n  T y P E
D E f i n i T i O n
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Figure 3 shows the range of replication across the 19 villages included in this study. Rates 
of replication ranged from 0 to 7.8 replicated groups per project group and are grouped into 
quartiles, from lowest to highest. Approximately 37% of villages have a rate of replication 
above 1.5, and 20% of the villages have a rate of 3.5 or higher.
ClASSifiCATiOn Of REPliCATED gROUPS
Once we made the distinction between project groups and replicated groups, we found it 
necessary to further classify groups. Figure 4 shows the method used to create three main 
categories: project groups, replicated groups, and non-VSLA/SILC savings groups, which 
were not a focus of this study.6 Within replicated groups, we found three sub-categories: 
agent-formed, self-formed, and influenced. Agent-formed groups were formed by an agent 
no longer receiving pay from the project at the time of group formation.7 Self-formed groups 
were formed by group members themselves, but may have later enlisted an agent to provide 
training.8 Influenced groups (which may be agent-formed or self-formed) are distinguished by 
the relatively small number of traits they share with other VSLAs/SILCs.
f i g U R E  3 . 
Distribution of 
villages across 
replication quartiles
6 
The most common example of a 
non-vSlA/SilC savings group 
was a rotating savings and credit 
association (ROSCA).
7 
Throughout this report, “agent” 
refers to one of the following: 
a field agent or private service 
provider (PSP) for the CRS model 
or a community-based trainer 
(CBT) or village agent (vA) for the 
CARE model. Replicated groups 
were never formed by a project-
paid agent. More information 
on agents can be found in the 
Study Methods and Statistical 
Considerations Appendix.
8 
More information on the self-
formed and agent-formed 
classifications can be found in 
the Study Methods and Statistical 
Considerations Appendix.
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Of the 46 replicated groups in this study, 25 were self-formed, 15 were agent-formed, and 6 were 
influenced. Combined with the FSD Kenya finding that replication was primarily group-driven, 
the preponderance of self-formed groups in this study suggests the potency of group-driven 
replication (FSD Kenya, 2011). However, to draw a robust conclusion, further research is needed.
Figure 5 illustrates common traits of VSLAs/SILCs and the percent of groups in this study 
sharing each trait. This figure delineates the 14 traits considered to be core criteria for 
classification as a VSLA/SILC, showing the percent of study groups that met each one.
Figure 6 charts the 66 groups included in this study according to the number of core criteria 
they met. The majority of groups (91%) met at least ten of the 14 criteria. The remaining six 
groups, meeting only nine or fewer criteria, were observably different from the other groups 
and thus were classified as influenced groups. When necessary to avoid skewing the data, we 
excluded influenced groups because they often blended methods from VSLA/SILC and non-
VSLA/SILC savings groups.9
f i g U R E  5 . 
Percent of groups 
that met the 14 
core criteria
f i g U R E  4 . 
Classification of 
vSlA/SilC groups
RElATiOnSHiP 
TO fACiliTATing 
AgEnCy (fA)
group formed by 
an agent trained by 
CARE or CRS partner 
organization
group nOT formed 
by an agent trained 
by CARE or CRS 
partner organization
fUnDing AT 
fORMATiOn
Agent received pay 
from fA
Agent did nOT 
receive pay from fA
gROUP MEETS CORE 
vSlA/SilC CRiTERiA
TyPE Of gROUP
yes
Partially
no
Project-sponsored 
vSlA/SilC
Sample vSlA/SilC
Agent-formed 
Replicated vSlA/SilC
Self-formed 
Replicated vSlA/SilC
vSlA/SilC influenced
non-vSlA/SilC
Savings (e.g. ROSCA)
Project group
Replicated group
not included in Study
yes
yes
Used a ledger
Made loans
Charged interest on loans
Saved at least once per month
Had a repayment period between 1 and 3 months
Had a consistent share-out term
Had weekly minimum savings above 300 UgX
Had a social fund
Had a savings-to-loan ratio rule
Had 15 to 30 members
Used individual passbooks
gave loans primarily for investments
Had elections within the previous year
Used a cashbox
100%
100%
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98%
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89%
79%
79%
76%
71%
71%
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MAin fACTOR in REPliCATiOn: MEMBERSHiP in MUlTiPlE gROUPS
Data from our surveys and focus group discussions showed a striking phenomenon of group 
members concurrently belonging to more than one group. We refer to this as membership in 
multiple groups (MMG).10 MMG was ubiquitous among VSLAs/SILCs in Uganda, which affected 
the rate of replication. Of the 62 active groups in this study, 58 groups (93.5%) reported having 
at least one member who was also a member of another group. Figure 7 shows that almost half 
of the 58 groups reported that more than 50% of members belonged to another group, and 13 
groups stated that over 90% of their members belonged to another group. Seven focus groups 
had members who belonged to three or more groups, and some members were in as many as five.
Data on MMG show a strong correlation11 (correlation coefficient 0.4412) with the rate at which 
groups replicate, suggesting that variation in replication across villages is related to MMG. 
Indeed, groups in high-replication areas were much more likely to have a greater percent of 
MMG than groups located in areas with lower rates of replication (see Figure 8).13
9 
Theoretically, if this chart were 
to continue to the right it would 
reveal non-vSlA/SilC groups, with 
influenced groups located on the 
crux between vSlA/SilC and non-
vSlA/SilC.
f i g U R E  7 . 
Membership in 
multiple groups, by 
percent of members
1 1
The scale used to interpret 
correlation strength may be found 
in the Study Methods and Statistical 
Considerations Appendix.
1 2
Data on percent of members in 
other savings groups were missing 
for three of four disbanded groups, 
and the fourth disbanded group 
was removed from this correlation 
to maintain consistency. when the 
fourth disbanded group is included 
in this analysis, the correlation 
decreases slightly to 0.43.
1 3
Data are from sample groups 
only. The outlier, kagorora A, is a 
small village with one group, of 
which all members also belonged 
to additional groups outside of 
the village. values for Magoro 
village were averaged. Missing 
observations were removed.
1 0 
Other implications of membership 
in multiple groups (MMg) are 
discussed in greater detail in 
Section 5.
f i g U R E  6 . 
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Such high rates of MMG have implications for how practitioners view replication, since it 
suggests that it is not accurate to count every member of a replicated group as “new” to the 
model. Replicated groups do recruit many individuals with no prior VSLA/SILC experience, but 
the number of previously unreached members may not be as high as once thought.
OTHER fACTORS
Table 1 summarizes other factors that may influence rates of replication, along with their 
correlation strength, correlation coefficients, and possible explanations for each trend.14 The 
correlations to replication range in strength from moderate (in the case of minimum savings 
requirements) to weak (in the case of size of starting membership and first share-out value). 
While this provides some insight into potential drivers of replication, further research will be
necessary to obtain any degree of certainty.
1 4 
These are correlations, and do 
not prove causality. The list is not 
comprehensive, but provides a 
foundation upon which further 
research to better understand 
the drivers of replication may be 
conducted.
f i g U R E  8 . 
Percent of members 
in other groups across 
replication quartiles
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gROUP 
CHARACTERiSTiC
Minimum savings 
requirements
Size of starting 
membership
value of first share-out
CORRElATiOn 
STREngTH
moderate
weak
weak
CORRElATiOn 
COEffiCiEnT
.35 
.24
.24
POSSiBlE
EXPlAnATiOn
Members want to establish a new group 
with more manageable weekly savings 
requirements than existing groups.
Members want to join existing groups, but 
there are few open spaces for new members, 
so they decide to start new groups.
Members observe the success of existing 
groups, compelling them to form a new group.
63%
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Replication rates appeared to be higher in villages where all project groups remained active 
compared with those where a project group had disbanded. The average replication rate in 
villages with an active project group was 2.6, whereas villages with a disbanded project 
group had a rate of 1.5. Population density and distance to an urban area15 had a negligible 
relationship with replication rates. There also did not appear to be a relationship between 
whether a replicated group mentioned learning from another savings group and the replication 
rate in that village.
SATURATiOn
Full project saturation is met when every member of the eligible population participates in a 
VSLA or SILC, measured on a scale of 0% to 100% (full saturation).16 The high rates of MMG 
complicate any attempts to estimate saturation. Figure 9 gives estimates for saturation using 
data on village population and group membership, showing that nearly 20% of groups are well 
over 100% saturation.
We tested the correlation between saturation and replication and found a weak-to-negligible 
relationship (-.11). However, the negative direction of this relationship is logical, suggesting 
that replication will slow, or even stop, as villages approach saturation.
f i g U R E  9 . 
Estimated levels of 
project saturation, 
by village
1 5
Distance to an urban area is 
calculated using the distance from 
a village’s center to the closest 
urban area. kagorora A village was 
not included in this correlation.
1 6 
Saturation is calculated by dividing 
the estimated total membership 
(average group size*total groups) 
by estimated eligible population 
(total number of households*2 
adults).
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HOw AnD wHy DO REPliCATED gROUPS fORM?
Data from focus group discussions with the 46 replicated groups shed light on how and why 
replicated groups form. Group members discussed how they got the idea to form a group, 
where they acquired the knowledge and materials, what they expected to get out of the group, 
and what challenges they faced during the initial phases of development.
 key findings
	 •		 Members	mainly	got	the	idea	to	start	a	replicated	group	by	observing	and	interacting	with		 	
  existing groups. for technical knowledge and support, they turned in relatively equal measure  
  to existing groups and to agents.
	 •		 Overall,	three	expectations	motivated	members	to	join	replicated	groups:	to	pay	immediate		
  and recurring costs (such as school fees), to meet future needs such as starting a business,  
  and to gain access to services such as borrowing and saving.
SOURCES Of SUPPORT fOR gROUP fORMATiOn
Initial group formation requires two crucial components: the idea to start a savings and loan 
group, and the necessary technical knowledge and support to be successful. Overall, the main 
inspiration to form a group came from members’ observations of and interactions with existing 
groups. For technical knowledge and support, newly forming groups looked not only to 
existing groups, but also to agents in relatively equal measure.
Figure 10 shows the responses from focus groups that discussed how members got the idea 
to start a VSLA/SILC. Of 41 groups, 28 mentioned they got the idea from another savings 
group. Only 14 groups said an agent gave them the idea to form a VSLA/SILC. Interestingly, 
even within the subset of groups that had been formed with the help of an agent, 21% 
mentioned that the idea to form a group actually came from another savings group, not just 
the agent. Finally, a small number of groups mentioned that a government-sponsored radio 
announcement or government official had sparked the idea.17
f i g U R E  1 0 . 
where replicated 
groups got the iDEA to 
form a vSlA/SilC
We are now in our 
second year, and all 
of the knowledge and 
skills were gotten 
from the other SILC 
groups. 
M E M B E R  O f  g i S U  S i l C 
g R O U P,  k A S E S E
Member: After getting 
started, [an agent] 
came and approached 
us and gave us more 
guidelines on how to 
operate the group. 
And that’s how we 
managed to move on.
Moderator: What 
specific guidelines 
or assistance did he 
provide?
Member: He taught 
us how to prepare 
the ledgers, balance 
the cashbook, how 
to save and lend 
amongst ourselves, 
and even advised us 
on how much we are 
supposed to charge in 
terms of interest on 
loans. 
M E M B E R  O f  B i n y O n i 
T wA n Z A n E  g R O U P, 
k A S E S E
05 10 15 20 25 30
Other groups
Agent
goverment
Community member
0
nUMBER  Of  f OCUS gROUP S
28
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1 7 
Because data in this section 
are drawn from focus group 
discussions, and because groups 
often provided multiple responses 
to each question, the number of 
responses is typically not equal to 
the total number of focus groups.
2
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Figure 11 shows the number of responses from focus groups that discussed how members 
acquired the technical knowledge to form a VSLA/SILC. Of 43 groups, 26 cited agents as the 
source of this kind of support for their formation. Interestingly, nearly as many groups (25) 
cited other groups as a source of technical support. This tendency of groups to learn from 
other groups is corroborated by our survey data, which indicate that 31 of the 66 groups (16 
replicated and 15 project) had trained at least one other group in SILC/VSLA methodology. 
Besides agents and other groups, mentions of other sources dropped steeply. Government, 
group and community members, and other financial institutions each only received three to 
five mentions, indicating that these are not common sources of technical knowledge or support 
for forming a replicated group.
Focus groups also mentioned the important role agents play in acquiring necessary materials, 
such as ledgers or passbooks for recording transactions, or a cashbox for storing the group’s 
funds. In 12 of our focus groups, members mentioned they provided cash to an agent, who 
then purchased these materials and brought them to the group.
Given the important role of other savings groups in providing both the initial idea and the 
technical knowledge to form a replicated group, it is not surprising that most replicated groups 
had at least one member with prior savings group experience at the time of formation. Figure 
12 shows the responses from 41 focus groups on this topic. Nearly all—39 of 41 groups—noted 
that at least one member had some prior savings group experience, the most common of which 
was as a member of a different VSLA/SILC.
f i g U R E  1 1 . 
where replicated 
groups got the 
knOwlEDgE to 
form a vSlA/SilC
f i g U R E  1 2 . 
groups with member 
experience in other 
savings groups, by 
experience type
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EXPECTATiOnS Of gROUP fORMATiOn
Members of replicated VSLAs/SILCs shared their reasons for joining the group and what 
they expected to achieve. Of the 166 responses from 45 focus groups shown in Figure 13, 
45% referred to immediate needs including the most common response, children’s education 
(especially paying school fees). Fewer (28%) mentioned expectations of meeting future needs 
such as starting a business or acquiring an asset. Another 20% mentioned specific services of 
the project model such as the ability to borrow money and build savings.
Educate Children
Borrow Money
Develop or help self or family
Start or grow a business
Acquire an asset
Accrue savings
network or make friends
improve living conditions
Earn a profit at share-out
Meet daily needs
Pay for medical expenses
Access social fund
gain knowledge
keep savings safe
The reason we started 
the group is we 
needed to pay school 
fees for our children. 
You would find you 
had no money, then 
you would run to a 
friend to ask for a 
loan from his group 
or her group, but 
that group could not 
give us their loans 
because we were not 
group members. We 
decided to put up our 
own group that could 
assist us to 
raise school fees for 
our children. 
M E M B E R  O f 
B U n yA M U R wA  w i D O w ’ S 
g R O U P,  k A S E S E
Originally when I 
joined this group, 
I would ask for a loan 
at the same time as 
three other people. 
In this case, I 
wouldn’t get a loan 
or the amount of 
money I needed. 
For me, the group 
is not providing 
assistance or help. 
The group doesn’t 
have enough money 
to benefit all members. 
M E M B E R  O f  B U T E M U R A 
T wA n Z A n E  g R O U P, 
k A S E S E
I knew that by joining 
this group I would 
also develop myself 
by investing, which 
I’ve done so far, as 
I now own a goat.
M E M B E R  O f  n k U R U n g U 
T U k U n D A n E  g R O U P, 
k A M w E n g E
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Figure 14 shows results from members whose expectations referred to one of four services 
provided by the VSLA/SILC model. Most responses (25) cited borrowing money, highlighting 
the very limited access to credit in the region. The second-most cited response (11) was the 
ability to accrue savings. Only three members cited a need to keep savings safe.
Overall, members of groups expressed satisfaction with their VSLA/SILC experience. Figure 15 
shows that 60% of focus groups mentioning expectations had their expectations met, compared 
to 40% that mentioned expectations that had not been met. Most unmet expectations included 
financial constraints—limited loan pool, small share-out—which are to be expected given the 
relatively new status of these young groups. Similarly, 71% of focus groups that mentioned 
surprises noted they were positive ones, such as higher-than-expected share-outs, compared to 
29% reporting negative surprises, such as a high incidence of defaulters in the group.
f i g U R E  1 3 . 
Member expectations 
upon joining a vSlA/SilC
f i g U R E  1 4 . 
vSlA/SilC services cited 
as reasons for joining 
replicated groups
They trained us that when 
you get a loan it should 
be linked to the money 
you have saved. This 
rule is not helping us to 
meet our expectations 
because if you need a 
cow it is hard to access 
a 1,000,000 loan from a 
group if you have saved 
only 300,000. 
M E M B E R  O f  T w E y i M U S E 
g R O U P,  k i B A A l E
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We used to not believe 
that somebody can save 
money and at the end 
of the cycle get a share 
of about 200,000, that 
sometimes one saves 
100,000 and at the end 
of the cycle one gets 
170,000. Therefore it is 
a surprise and I did not 
believe it could happen 
that money in a group 
can earn profits. 
M E M B E R  O f  n yA k i y U M B U 
w O M E n ’ S  g R O U P  B , 
k A S E S E
What surprised me was 
the amount of money 
that we shared. Nine 
million was a lot of 
money. I had never seen 
that before. 
M E M B E R  O f 
A B A g A M B A k A M U  g R O U P, 
k i B A A l E
nUMBER Of  MEMBERS
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CHAllEngES Of gROUP fORMATiOn
Probing questions uncovered a number of challenges members experienced as they were 
forming a replicated group. This topic was raised in 42 focus group discussions, of which 41 
mentioned facing at least one challenge as they were forming. Overall, most challenges did 
not stem from operational issues associated with adopting the model, but rather were due to 
financial constraints, which made up half of all challenges mentioned. The most common 
of these, mentioned 22 times, was a difficulty coming up with money. Almost a third of 
challenges were personal character-related issues such as dealing with defaulters, theft, or 
absenteeism. Only 20% of challenges concerned operational issues related to the model such as 
difficulty attracting members, poor bookkeeping, or a lack of external support (see Figure 16).
f i g U R E  1 5 . 
Member satisfaction with 
vSlA/SilC experience, by 
expectations and surprises
f i g U R E  1 6 . 
Challenges of 
group formation
The main challenge 
is little savings. 
Some of us are 
businessmen and at 
times we come here 
in need of a loan, but 
we find almost every 
member is facing 
the same problem, 
and we end up not 
gaining because the 
money is always 
little.
M E M B E R  O f  B U R E M B O 
T U T U n g U k y E  g R O U P, 
k A M w E n g E
We are farmers, 
and sometimes 
seasons don’t go 
well. We plant 
foodstuffs, but 
when [the season] 
is spoiled, we don’t 
get money to save.
M E M B E R  O f 
B U n yA M U R wA  O n i O n 
fA R M E R ’ S  g R O U P, 
k A S E S E
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Use of agent services did not appear to be related to whether a group experienced formation 
challenges: 27 of the 28 replicated groups that used agent services at some point still 
mentioned facing one or more formation challenge. Moreover, groups that had the help of an 
agent mentioned the top five formation challenges about as often those that had no help (see 
Figure 17). Note that groups were not asked whether the challenge had been resolved. It is 
possible that groups using agent services were more able to overcome formation challenges, 
but testing this theory would require further research.
f i g U R E  1 7 . 
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HOw DOES THE PERfORMAnCE Of REPliCATED gROUPS COMPARE 
wiTH THAT Of PROjECT gROUPS?
 key findings
	 •		 Replicated	groups	showed	a	higher	rate	of	return	on	savings	(35%)	compared	with	project		 	
  groups at 30%. However, replicated groups offered smaller loans and were less likely to achieve  
  100% loan access (where every member received a loan in the most recent complete cycle). 
  More research is needed to explain conclusively why, despite other performance factors, 
  replicated groups appeared to have a higher return on savings.
	 •		 Replicated	groups	appeared	to	show	a	higher	default	rate,	although	this	finding	also	merits	
  further study. groups’ reporting may have been affected by variations in the definitions of 
  delinquency and default. for example, the vSlA/SilC model enables a member to use his or 
  her share-out to repay an outstanding loan from the same cycle—an important feature that 
  gives the borrower flexibility and protects the group against default. Since this study design 
  does not specifically capture each case in which a delinquent loan was repaid from the 
  borrower’s share-out, it may inadvertently overstate rates of default.
In this section we draw on data from surveys of 46 replicated groups and 20 project groups 
to compare their overall performance. Where possible, we make further comparisons within 
the three types of replicated groups (agent-formed, self-formed, and influenced). Data are 
presented on five indicators of performance: minimum savings required, return on savings, 
size of loans, access to loans, and rate of default. Group age, measured in years in operation, 
was not found to be correlated with the first four performance indicators.18 There was a weak, 
negative correlation (correlation coefficient -0.2119) between group age and default rate, 
suggesting that older groups may have been less likely to experience default. 
MiniMUM SAvingS REQUiRED
Most groups had a minimum savings requirement of exactly 1,000 Ugandan shillings (UGX) 
per week, referred to as “share purchases” in the CARE model or “minimum savings” in the 
CRS model. Overall, we found no substantial difference in these saving requirements between 
project and replicated groups. However, within replicated groups, influenced groups did have 
notably lower savings requirements, with 67% reporting minimum savings requirements below 
250 UGX.20 By contrast, the lowest requirement for project groups and agent-formed replicated 
groups was 500 UGX (See Figure 18).
1 8 
See Section 3, Appendix 2: 
Performance Correlation Results.
1 9 
Correlation excludes disbanded 
groups and groups that had not yet 
completed a cycle.
2 0
This finding should be interpreted 
with caution due to the small 
influenced group sample size (6).
We did not know that 
we would ever be 
respected around the 
village, but now, since 
we joined the group, 
we are able to make 
our money, [engage 
in] business, and use 
the profits to make 
our lives simpler, in 
terms of buying food 
and clothes.
M E M B E R  O f  B i n y O n i 
T wA n Z A n E  g R O U P, 
k A S E S E
3
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f i g U R E  1 8 . 
Minimum savings 
required, by group 
type (UgX)
Project
Agent-formed
Self-formed
influenced
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
  <250         250-499         500-999         1000-1499        1500-1999        2000-2499       2500-3000         >3000         
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RETURn On SAvingS
Overall, the average simple return on savings (ROS)21 for replicated groups appeared higher 
than that for project groups. The distribution of ROS across groups is shown in Figure 19. 
While 31% of replicated groups reported ROS of at least 40%, only 19% of project groups 
reported ROS at that level. Average ROS for replicated groups was 35%, while that for project 
groups was 30%.22 In addition, within replicated groups, average ROS for the self-formed 
category was 41%, and for agent-formed groups, 30%.
A possible explanation for higher average ROS among replicated groups could stem from these 
groups’ formation outside of the guidelines imposed on project groups. Replicated groups 
were free to set their minimum savings and interest rates higher, which it appears they did: 
on average, interest rates were 0.7% higher and weekly savings minimums were 85 UGX 
higher among replicated groups. More research is needed to explain conclusively the observed 
differences in ROS.
lOAn SiZE
The most common loan size across all groups was 150,000 UGX. Project groups on average 
made larger loans than replicated groups, with 75% of project groups making loans of at least 
150,000 UGX, compared to 42% of replicated groups (See Figure 20). Within replicated groups, 
agent-formed groups typically made larger loans than self-formed. Influenced groups made the 
smallest loans (See Figure 21).
Higher return on savings among replicated groups despite smaller loan size may suggest that 
they have a relatively high degree of portfolio utilization, consistently lending out a relatively 
large portion of the group’s cash during a given cycle.
f i g U R E  1 9 . 
Return on savings, 
replicated groups v. 
project groups
2 1 
Simple return on savings 
was calculated as (A) a 
group’s total savings at the 
end of the most recent cycle 
plus the total value of any 
initial fees paid, subtracted 
from (B) total share-out 
plus the value of any group 
property acquired during the 
cycle, divided by (B).
2 2
See Appendices: Section 3, 
Appendix 1.
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f i g U R E  2 0 . 
Most common loan 
size, replicated groups 
v. project groups (UgX)
f i g U R E  2 1 . 
loan size, by group 
type (UgX)
By forming this group 
we have already 
benefited a lot. We 
have paid school fees 
for our children, we 
have money to pay for 
our family needs, and 
we are planning to 
add more members so 
that the savings can 
increase. 
M E M B E R  O f 
k A l E yA l E yA  w O M E n 
w i T H  D i S A B i l i T i E S 
g R O U P,  B U n D i B U g y O
loan Size
< 150,000 UgX
loan Size
> 150,000 UgX
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lOAn ACCESS
The majority of all groups (71%) reported 100% loan access—where every member received a 
loan—during the most recent complete cycle (See Figure 22). Project groups were considerably 
more likely than replicated groups to have all members take out one or more loans. This 
suggests that access to loans may be more equitable in project groups, although it could not 
be determined from present data whether members who did not take loans were prevented 
from accessing them, or rather chose not to. Self-formed groups, on average, reported the 
lowest rate of 100% loan access. Only 56% of self-formed groups reported that all members 
had received loans during the last cycle (See Figure 23). Less equitable loan access among 
self-formed groups may be an early sign of elite capture. This is a phenomenon that should 
be closely monitored, particularly for signs that loan size is increasing without equivalent 
expansion in loan access.
Before [I joined the 
group] I was not in 
business, but at least 
now I can borrow and 
buy sacks of beans 
and maize. Then I 
sell them.
M E M B E R  O f  i RyA n g A B i 
A B A M w E  g R O U P, 
k A M w E n g E
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DEfAUlT RATE
The majority of groups in this study had a low default rate (defined as percent of loans not fully 
repaid by the end of the most recently completed cycle).23 Across all group types, the average 
default rate was 4.7%. Overall, 74.2% of groups had a default rate of 4% or lower, with 66.1% 
reporting a rate of 0%. Project groups on average had a default rate of 2.1%, while replicated 
groups reported 5.8%. Within replicated groups, agent-formed groups had the highest default 
rate (7%) and influenced groups had the lowest, at 0.2% (see Figures 24 and 25).
f i g U R E  2 2 . 
( l E f T )
loan access in most 
recent complete 
cycle, all groups
f i g U R E  2 3 . 
( R i g H T )
Access to loans in 
most recent complete 
cycle, by group type
2 3
Default rate calculations exclude 
disbanded groups and groups that 
have not yet completed a cycle.
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2.1%
5.8%
The distribution of default rates for each group type is shown in Figure 26. With the exception 
of influenced groups, default rates were fairly consistent across group type. Rates of 5% or 
higher were experienced by 25% of project groups, 26.7% of agent-formed groups, and 32% 
of self-formed groups. Influenced groups had notably lower default rates, with 100% of groups 
reporting default rates between 0% and 4%. This may be at least partially attributed to the 
smaller loans typically made by influenced groups, assuming that smaller loans are more 
easily repaid.
f i g U R E  2 4 .
( l E f T ) 
Average default rate, 
replicated groups v. 
project groups
f i g U R E  2 5 .
( R i g H T ) 
Average default rate, by 
replicated group type
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Our findings on all groups’ default rates merit further study. Groups’ reporting may have been 
affected by variations in the definitions of delinquency and default. For example, the VSLA/
SILC model enables a member to use his or her share-out to repay an outstanding loan from 
the same savings cycle—an important feature that gives the borrower flexibility and protects 
the group against default. Indeed, as one group member in our study reported, “When we 
share-out we get the chance, for those people who have debts, [to] clear [them]. Those who 
are in need of a loan are given loans on that very day and we begin afresh.” Since this study 
design does not specifically capture each case in which a delinquent loan was thus safely 
repaid from the borrower’s share-out, it may overstate rates of default.
USE Of AgEnT SERviCES AnD PERfORMAnCE
Fully 100% of project groups and 62% of replicated groups in this study employed an agent at 
some point in the group’s history. Overall, groups that mentioned having used agent services 
performed better than those that did not.24 Groups that used agent services had, on average, 
larger share-outs, including in the first year (see Table 2). They also experienced higher 
average growth in share-out between their first and most recent cycle.25 There was a slight 
difference in return on savings favoring groups that had not used an agent. Default rates were 
roughly comparable.26
f i g U R E  2 6 . 
Default rate, by 
group type
TA B l E  2 . 
Use of agent 
services 
and group 
performance, 
all groups
2 4
Data in this section were drawn 
from both surveys and focus 
groups.
2 5
Average share-out growth excludes 
influenced groups, which were 
seen to skew the results (including 
these six groups altered the growth 
rates to 1421% for groups that did 
not use an agent and 127% for 
groups that did).
2 6
Default rate calculations did not 
include disbanded groups or 
groups that have not yet completed 
one year.
When we share-out 
we get the chance, 
for those people who 
have debts, [to] clear 
[them]. Those who 
are in need of a loan 
are given loans on 
that very day and we 
begin afresh.
M E M B E R  O f  k AT E E T E E 
T U k wATA n i S E  g R O U P, 
B U S H E n y i
DiD THE 
gROUP 
USE AgEnT 
SERviCES?
no
yes
AvERAgE 
SiMPlE 
RETURn On 
SAvingS
37%
33%
AvERAgE 
fiRST 
SHARE-OUT 
(UgX)
1,781,372 
3,402,116
AvERAgE 
lAST 
SHARE-OUT 
(UgX)
2,856,194
5,786,448
AvERAgE 
SHARE-OUT 
gROwTH 
(UgX)
69%
104%
AvERAgE 
DEfAUlT 
RATE
4.6%
4.8%
Project
Agent-formed
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influenced
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Because all project and agent-formed groups by definition had the help of an agent, 
comparisons based on agent utilization could not be made. However, it is possible to examine 
self-formed groups’ use of agent services. Return on savings, first share-out, and most recent 
share-out were, on average, all slightly greater among self-formed groups that had used an 
agent (see Table 3). However, average default rate was also greater, and average share-out 
growth actually decreased. These mixed results may indicate that self-formed groups did 
not use agent services as extensively as other group types, thus failing to experience the full 
positive effects. More research is needed to determine how long after formation self-formed 
groups engage agents, what services they use, and the effect agent services have on their 
performance.
TA B l E  3 . 
Use of agent 
services and group 
performance, 
self-formed groups
We find already 
that our group is 
growing and growing, 
bigger than we had 
anticipated.
M E M B E R  O f  A O l 
i n y E k O  g R O U P,  l i R A
DiD THE 
gROUP 
USE AgEnT 
SERviCES?
no
yes
AvERAgE 
SiMPlE 
RETURn On 
SAvingS
39%
45%
AvERAgE 
fiRST 
SHARE-OUT 
(UgX)
2,019,914 
2,352,518
AvERAgE 
lAST 
SHARE-OUT 
(UgX)
2,459,393
2,865,446
AvERAgE 
SHARE-OUT 
gROwTH 
(UgX)
69%
23%
AvERAgE 
DEfAUlT 
RATE
6.3%
7.3%
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wHAT DO MEMBERS Of REPliCATED gROUPS REPORT ABOUT 
THEiR EXPERiEnCE?
 key findings
	 •		 Overall,	in	replicated	groups	most	members	(85%)	learned	or	improved	savings	habits	
  through membership in vSlAs or SilCs. nearly half of replicated groups credited the group 
  directly with teaching them how to save.
	 •		 Share-outs	were	most	commonly	used	for	investments	(63%),	particularly	in	livestock	and	land.	
  loans were most often used to fund immediate needs and school fees (53%).
	 •		 Specific comments about saving and borrowing raised a concern that some members
  of replicated groups may have been making financial decisions not consistent with the model’s  
  intent. for example, 22% of groups had members who reported having sold assets to meet 
  their savings requirement, a dynamic that, if involving productive assets, could indicate a   
  misunderstanding of financial concepts. Similarly, two groups reported that members took   
  loans from one group to meet the saving requirements in another. These individual decisions  
  highlight the need for further study to determine whether members of replicated groups are  
  receiving adequate training in vital concepts of financial literacy.
	 •		 The majority (54%) of replicated groups did not provide any form of financial compensation   
  for agent services. However, self-formed groups paid for agent services at more than twice the  
  rate of agent-formed groups, and were far more likely to continue using agent services into the  
  current cycle.
	 •		 The	most	common	change	replicated	groups	made	to	their	constitution	was	to	increase	the		
  minimum savings requirement. The most common rule addition they made was to implement  
  fines (for defaults, absenteeism, and late arrival to meetings). groups that changed rules   
  performed better, on average.
ESTABliSHing THE COnCEPT Of SAving
Respondents in focus group discussions reported that exposure to VSLAs or SILCs helped 
them establish or improve a concept of saving. Nearly 85% of replicated groups had at least 
one member who reported that they previously had never saved money, or that they had used 
an informal saving mechanism, such as keeping cash under the mattress. Members in 46% 
of groups attributed their concept of saving directly to experience in a VSLA or SILC. As a 
member of Ababaca A group in Kasese district noted, “Before we started this group, whatever 
money we would get, we would spend it. When we started this group, we learned how to save.” 
Respondents appreciated many group benefits of saving, including growth in savings due to 
interest, safety from theft, and restraint from personal spending.
Most groups seemed to adapt well to the concept of saving and found it relatively easy to meet 
their saving requirement. In the majority (90%), members said that engaging in business or 
labor enabled them to make their regular saving requirements. In 24% of groups, members cited 
choosing to reduce consumption.
Three members came 
to me and advised 
me to join the group. 
I told them, “I don’t 
have enough money 
for you. You save 
a lot of money.” So 
they advised me that 
I can save 300 or 
400 shillings, and 
therefore I decided 
to join and started 
saving. Since that day 
when I started saving, 
I feel I have peace 
thanks to the group.
M E M B E R  O f  B i n y O n i 
T wA n Z A n E  g R O U P, 
k A S E S E
Before we started 
this group, whatever 
money we would get, 
we would spend it. 
When we started this 
group, we learned 
how to save.
M E M B E R  O f  A B A B A C A  A 
g R O U P,  k A S E S E
Before joining these 
groups, we would spend 
money aimlessly. For 
example, by drinking 
alcohol and eating good 
food. But now, to raise 
money for savings, you 
have to forgo most of 
these pleasures just to 
raise money.
M E M B E R  O f  B i T i R A 
T U M A n yA n n E  g R O U P, 
B U S H E n y i
4
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Specific comments about saving raised a concern that some members of replicated groups may 
have been making financial decisions not consistent with the model’s intent. For example, 22% 
of groups had members who reported having sold assets to meet their savings requirement, a 
dynamic that, if involving productive assets, could indicate a misunderstanding of financial 
concepts.27 Similarly, two groups reported that members took loans from one group to meet the 
saving requirements in another. These individual decisions highlight the need for further study 
to determine whether members of replicated groups are receiving adequate training in vital 
concepts of financial literacy.
Sometimes I sell 
property because I 
fail to get enough to 
save. If I can’t save 
in the group, the 
members may laugh 
at me. I sell off my 
chickens so that I 
can save. 
M E M B E R  O f 
B U T E M U R A  T wA n Z A n E 
g R O U P,  k A S E S E
2 7 
Selling an asset to meet saving 
requirements was generally an 
indication that a group was not 
performing well. See Section 4, 
Appendix 1: Asset Sales Cross-
Tabulation Results.
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USE Of lOAnS AnD SHARE-OUTS
Members of replicated groups took out loans most often to fund immediate needs (53%), 
followed by investments in business (47%) (see Figure 27). Of the immediate needs, 60% of 
responding groups mentioned school fees, and 13% mentioned they used loans to pay off loans 
in other groups. Most common business investments included retail or trade, followed closely 
by agriculture.
Data in Figure 28 show that a full 100% of groups had at least one member who used share-
outs28 for some type of investment, and that investments were the most-mentioned use of 
share-out (63%). The next most common uses of share-outs included immediate needs such as 
school fees. Of the immediate needs, 15% of groups had members who mentioned using their 
share-out to pay off loans.
f i g U R E  2 7 . 
Use of loans, 
replicated groups
f i g U R E  2 8 . 
Use of share-outs, 
replicated groups
2 8 
The share-out comprises the total savings 
accumulated over the course of a cycle, 
plus interest and fees, and is distributed 
among members at the end of the cycle.
The first share-out I 
bought two goats. Then 
the second share-out 
I bought another one. 
Now they are three and 
they’re all producing. 
M E M B E R  O f  i RyA n g A B i 
A B A M w E  g R O U P, 
k A M w E n g E
The first time I shared 
out I bought a plot of 
land—I paid half way. 
I intend to pay the 
rest and complete [the 
purchase]. 
M E M B E R  O f  k A B U n yA S i 
T w i M U k y E  g R O U P, 
k A M w E n g E
When we shared out, 
my children didn’t 
have a bed to sleep in, 
so I bought a mattress 
for my children to 
sleep on. 
M E M B E R  O f  O B U n A k U 
n i n D A l i  g R O U P,  k A S E S E
For me, I have my 
shop. When I get my 
shares I go and buy 
more items and put 
them in the shop so 
that it expands.
M E M B E R  O f  B A k A ly E 
T wA n Z A n E  g R O U P, 
k A S E S E
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Daily needs
Housing improvements
Pay loan, other group
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Data in Figure 29 show that among members who invested their share-outs, most (73%) made 
investments in agriculture, followed by a retail or trading business (14%).29 Livestock was the 
most common agriculture-related purchase, followed by a plot of land. Most members (47%) 
preferred to invest in purchasing goats.
USE Of AgEnT SERviCES
The majority (61%) of replicated groups had help from an agent at some time, including 44% 
of self-formed groups and 33% of influenced groups (see Figure 30). For agent-formed groups, 
sometime after formation the use of agent services, on average, made a considerable drop, 
from 100% “at any time” to 60% “in the current cycle.”30 This drop was far less steep for self-
formed groups that had used agent services. For these groups, agent use declined from 44% “at 
any time” to 36% in the “current cycle.”31 This implies that although self-formed groups did 
not start out with the help of an agent, those that eventually engaged an agent’s services (with 
or without pay) typically found it useful to continue receiving the services over time, including 
through the current cycle.
f i g U R E  2 9 . 
Share-out purchases, 
replicated groups
2 9 
Retail goods/goods for resale 
includes items like second-hand 
clothes, fish, beans, charcoal, and 
raw coffee berries, which were 
processed and resold. Productive 
inputs nES includes goods such 
as a plow, pesticide, a sewing 
machine, and millet used for 
brewing.
3 0 
Data on use of agent services 
“at any time” are from focus group 
discussions and surveys; data 
on use of agent services during 
the “current cycle” are from 
surveys only.
3 1
Project groups (not shown) were 
the most likely overall to continue 
using an agent’s services, with 
75% reporting having used these 
services in the most recent year.
f i g U R E  3 0 . 
Use of agent services, by 
replicated group type
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Before I joined I 
didn’t have enough 
plantings for my 
pineapples. When 
I got a loan, I used 
it to transport the 
plantings and paid 
workers. Now I get 
money from the sale 
of pineapples to pay 
workers and fees for 
my children, and then 
pay back the loan.
M E M B E R  O f  B U R E M B O 
T U k wATA n i Z E  g R O U P, 
k A M w E n g E
PERCEnT Of  gROUP S 
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Of the eight agent service categories in Figure 31, the service mentioned by the most groups 
was training during formation, particularly in how to save and how to use the SILC/VSLA 
methodology (see Figure 32). Other services included post-formation training and help 
purchasing materials.
The majority (54%) of replicated groups did not provide any form of financial compensation 
for agent services. However, an interesting finding is that the majority of self-formed groups 
did pay for agent services. Indeed, 70% of self-formed groups paid for agent services, a rate 
twice that of agent-formed groups 33% (see Figure 33). This suggests that groups who were 
approached and offered a service may have been less motivated to pay for it than groups that 
actively sought it out. If this is the case, then further replication may help sustain the model 
as new, self-formed groups seek out and pay for agent services. However, more research over a 
longer period is needed to test this theory.
f i g U R E  3 1 .  ( T O P ) 
Use of agent services, 
replicated groups
f i g U R E  3 2 .  ( B O T T O M )
Training received from 
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The challenge we had 
[when we started] was 
we didn’t know what 
to do. After we called 
[the agent], he began 
showing us what to 
do. We were keeping 
records on pieces of 
paper, and he told 
us to buy books. He 
told us where to buy 
stamps, and how to 
place the stamps. With 
his help, the challenge 
of not knowing what 
to do was overcome. 
Currently the big 
challenge we have is 
that [the agent] does 
not have a salary.
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inCREASED wEEkly SAvingS
Many groups (24%) felt comfortable enough with the VSLA or SILC model to raise their weekly 
savings requirement after formation, and 13% increased the interest rates on loans. Naturally, 
this translated to higher group performance, such as growth in share-out (see Table 4).32
f i g U R E  3 3 . 
Percent of groups that 
paid for agent
services, by group type
3 2 
Outliers removed.
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wHAT DOES MEMBERSHiP in MUlTiPlE gROUPS TEll US ABOUT 
REPliCATiOn AnD THE vSlA/SilC MODEl?
 key findings
	 •		 MMG	is	higher	among	replicated	groups	(56%)	than	project	groups	(47%).
	 •		 The	top	four	reasons	for	MMG—50	of	87	responses—suggest	that	members	who	joined	more		
  than one group had saving and borrowing needs that could not be met by membership in a  
  single group.
	 •		 Our	data	indicate	that	relatively	prosperous	members	may	join	multiple	groups	to	maximize	
  their saving and borrowing. we found no indication that MMg in itself had negative effects   
  for savings groups or their members. However, the data suggest that some members have  
  taken out loans to pay off debt to other groups. This shifting of debt from group to group   
  could potentially enable a borrower to enter a cycle of debt that the vSlA/SilC model is well 
  designed to protect against—within any one savings group. Potential debt shifting made   
  possible by the phenomenon of membership in multiple groups, by contrast, merits 
  further research.
MEMBERSHiP in MUlTiPlE gROUPS ACROSS gROUP TyPES
Replicated groups had a higher rate of MMG. On average, 56% of replicated group members 
were also participating in other groups, while the same figure for project groups was 47% (see 
Figure 34). Within replicated groups, influenced groups had the highest rate, with an average 
of 63% of members belonging to multiple groups.
f i g U R E  3 4 . 
Percent of groups 
whose members were
in multiple groups, by 
group type
The reason why I want 
to be in two groups is 
because I am used to 
interacting with many 
people. I like getting help 
from all of my friends.
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wish to belong.
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MEMBERSHiP in MUlTiPlE gROUPS ACROSS fACiliTATing AgEnCiES
Figure 35 shows that on average, groups operating in CARE areas had a significantly higher 
rate of MMG37 than groups operating in CRS areas: an average of 66% of members were in 
more than one VSLA, compared to 38% of members in more than one SILC.
REASOnS fOR MEMBERSHiP in MUlTiPlE gROUPS AnD POSSiBlE liMiTATiOnS 
Of THE vSlA/SilC MODEl
Participants responded to the question “What are the benefits of being in multiple groups?” 
in 32 of the 46 focus group discussions. The top four reasons for MMG—50 of 87 responses—
suggest that members who joined more than one group had saving and borrowing needs that 
could not be met by membership in a single group. The ability to access multiple sources of 
credit was the most common reason for joining other groups, followed by the ability to earn 
more from multiple share-outs, the opportunity to save more excess income, and the ability to 
get cash to save or pay off a loan in another group (see Figure 36).
f i g U R E  3 5 . 
Membership in 
multiple groups, by 
facilitating agency
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membership in 
multiple groups
Being in more than 
one group is helpful 
because I save here 
and I also save with 
the other group. So 
at the end of the 
year I end up getting 
some good money 
from the two groups.
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Participants who cited access to additional sources of credit as a reason for joining multiple 
groups provided several explanations, which fall under two broad categories: insufficient 
capital, and timing (Figure 37). The most members (44%) said they needed to combine two 
loans to make a single purchase because the largest loan available in their first group often 
was not large enough. It is likely that this problem occurred earlier in a cycle, before the loan 
pool had a chance to grow. About 23% of respondents said timing was a constraint, and that 
they frequently needed an additional loan before they had fully repaid their first loan.33
Data suggest that there may be two types of members who typically join additional groups: 
relatively prosperous members who maximize different attributes of the financial services 
afforded by multiple groups, and relatively poor members who use MMG to shift debt from 
group to group. Below are direct quotes from members providing further evidence that one 
group is not sufficient to meet all of a member’s needs. Note that each of the members quoted 
below belonged to a group that had contact with an agent.
Moderator: Have you ever considered just saving more within one group instead of joining 
several groups?
Member: One is not enough. First of all, I have two children, the money I get from one cannot 
pay for two children’s school fees. (Kabunyasi Twimukye Group, Kamwenge)
Moderator: If [you] were just in one group, could [you] take out two loans, or one bigger loan, 
from the same group?
Member 1: It’s not possible. You have to first clear the first loan, then come for another one.
Member 2: Even if you buy many shares in this group, it’s not possible to take more than 
one loan. If you take 500,000, you have to first clear that date before they give you a second 
loan. But if you’re in two groups, you can as well cross over and borrow another 500,000 
from a different group. Sometimes you find the 500,000 you borrowed cannot solve the 
problem, so you’re forced to go into another group and get more money to get what you need. 
(Tukwatanize SILC Group, Kasese)
f i g U R E  3 7 . 
Reasons individuals 
sought multiple 
sources of credit
3 3 
Most groups have a rule 
requiring members fully repay 
one loan before they may qualify 
for another loan.
When you get different 
loans from different 
associations, it can 
help you because they 
meet on different 
dates. So you can get 
a loan in one, and use 
it to pay in the second 
association.
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Moderator: Why wouldn’t you just put all of your savings in this group?
Member: Sometimes, savings are limited. For instance here, the minimum savings is 1,000 
and maximum is 10,000. I may find that I have my money that I would like to save and can 
be limited by the rule. Then what happens is I take it and save it in another group. You may 
stay with it and eat it [use it up], so the best way is to take it and save it in another group. 
(St. Henry’s Group, Kasese)
POSSiBlE iMPliCATiOnS fOR inDiviDUAl AnD gROUP RiSk
Accessing multiple financial services is an important way that people in poverty manage 
money and smooth consumption. A study on poverty in Bangladesh found that no household 
surveyed had used fewer than four different kinds of financial tools over the course of the year 
and, on average, each used nine (Rutherford, 2010). Similarly, MMG increases opportunities for 
individuals to maximize their utility. This is demonstrated by the second and third most-cited 
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reasons for MMG: the desire to earn more from multiple share-outs, and to save more excess 
income. However, the most commonly cited reason—the desire to access multiple sources 
of credit—raises the possibility that individuals could shift debt from one group to another, 
potentially engaging in unsound borrowing practices that the model is designed to prevent in 
any one group. The potential debt shifting made possible by the phenomenon of membership 
in multiple groups, by contrast, merits further research.
The following sample of direct quotes provides examples of risky behavior associated with 
MMG, including taking multiple loans, taking loans in one group to make loan payments in 
other groups, taking loans in one group to make weekly savings in other groups, and selling 
assets to make weekly savings. All groups to which quoted members belonged had enlisted the 
services of an agent.
Moderator: I know that all 20 of you are in other savings and loan groups. Can you tell me 
why you decided to be in more than one group?
Member: Being in two groups has helped me to repay loans. For example, I can go to another 
group, and borrow a loan. This helps me to repay a loan in this group. (Kateetee Bitira 
Tumanyane Group, Bushenyi)
Member: I am in more than one group because if I fail to repay this group then I go and take 
a loan from the other group to use to pay and offset this one. (Kendahi Bakalye Twanzane 
Group, Kasese)
Member: Being in two groups has helped me to raise savings, for example I can come in this 
group, take a loan and I use it to save in the other group, due to the low interest rate on 
loans. (Nyamitoojo Bugaara Twetungure Group, Bushenyi)
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Conclusion
This study has examined savings groups in Ugandan villages to estimate the rate at which they 
replicated after the original project funding ended. It documents members’ motives for forming 
groups, showing the degree to which their experience met and exceeded initial expectations. 
Our data indicate that overall, the savings groups studied provided major benefits and fulfilled 
members’ desires to “grow” their money, by enabling them to save steadily and to borrow 
money to purchase assets that will generate future income. Members typically expressed 
satisfaction with their groups, and any surprises they encountered tended to be positive.
Of all the contributions savings groups appear to have made to improving the lives of their 
members, perhaps the greatest is the fundamental change in individuals’ relationship with 
money. This is readily apparent in the establishment of a steady habit of saving. In nearly all 
focus group discussions the enthusiasm was clear: not only does money “grow” through interest 
accrued, but also through the mere fact of being stored in one place where it can accumulate. 
This appears to be a game-changing dynamic clearly attributable to the VSLA/SILC model.
Further research is needed to assess the full influence of agents, especially on self-formed 
groups. How do self-formed groups become aware of the availability of agent services? At what 
point do self-formed groups seek out the help of an agent? How do membership, leadership, 
rules, meetings, transactions, and performance change after a self-formed group enlists an 
agent? What role do agents play in promoting financial literacy? A future study is needed to 
investigate the degree to which agent training is necessary for optimal performance.
A particularly rich area for future research is membership in multiple groups. Any future 
attempts to gauge saturation will need to look carefully at this quickly growing facet of savings 
groups in Uganda. The potential positive and negative effects of membership in multiple groups 
on the integrity of the model also merit further study. Important safeguards inherent to VSLA/
SILC project groups could potentially be by-passed—not by membership in multiple groups per 
se, but by individuals who join multiple groups to leverage more debt than they can repay. 
Further data collection will be needed to assess overall impacts and to ensure that the benefits 
of the model will remain intact over time.
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Appendices
STUDy METHODS AnD STATiSTiCAl COnSiDERATiOnS
Sampling: A random sample of 20 project groups—which resulted in 10 CARE and 10 CRS 
groups—was drawn from a list provided by SAVIX of CARE and CRS groups across all of Uganda.
The sample of 46 replicated groups was generated from suggestions from these sampled project 
groups. The replicated group sampling can therefore be considered random as their selection is 
grounded in the original random selection of project groups.
Survey methodology: Researchers administered surveys to all 66 groups included in this study. 
Surveys were conducted in small groups composed of a mix of executive committee members and 
regular group members. The survey had 55 questions and took an average of 30 to 60 minutes to 
complete.
Focus group methodology: Researchers held focus group discussions with the 46 replicated 
groups identified through this study. The facilitating researcher asked a series of open-ended 
questions to assembled group members, approximately 15 committee members and regular group 
members on average. An interpreter speaking the local language translated the questions to 
the group and the responses back the facilitator. Each focus group discussion was recorded and 
transcribed with the assistance of an interpreter.
Sample sizes: This study utilized a sample of 20 project groups and 46 replicated groups, of 
which 15 were agent-formed, 25 were self-formed, and 6 were influenced. A sample size of 27 is 
preferred for correlation analysis. It should be noted that correlations involving replication were 
conducted using the sub-sample of 20 project groups, allowing for the possibility that actual 
correlation strength may be weaker than reported here.
Normal distribution of data: This study assumes that the populations from which our samples 
were drawn were normally distributed.
Exclusion of data in statistical tests: Only complete observations were included in statistical tests.
Correlation Scale: The following scale was used in interpreting correlation strength:
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Source: Quinnipiac University. Pearson’s r Correlation. Retrieved September 12, 2013, from 
http://faculty.quinnipiac.edu/libarts/polsci/Statistics.html.
T-tests: This study used t-tests to determine whether observed differences between the average 
of a control group and a target group were statistically significant. T-tests were held to a 99% 
confidence level, represented by a p-value of 0.01. The use of the term “significant” in this 
report indicates that a difference was significant at the 99% confidence level.
Cross-tabulation: This study used cross-tabulation via pivot tables to examine relationships 
involving dummy variables. This approach provides a basic picture of the interrelation 
between two variables, but does not provide information about strength of relationship or 
statistical significance.
Types of agents: This study’s “agent” term is used to describe those individuals who received 
training and funding from CARE, CRS, or one of their partner organizations to spread the 
VSLA/SILC model in Uganda. These include the following designations:
Agent-formed and self-formed group classification detail: The table below describes the 
classification method for agent- and self-formed groups and provides some hypothetical 
examples.
R value (Correlation Coefficient) Interpretation  
+.70 or higher  Very strong positive relationship 
+.40 to +.69 Strong positive relationship 
+.30 to +.39 Moderate positive relationship 
+.20 to +.29 Weak positive relationship 
+.01 to +.19 No or negligible relationship 
-.01 to -.19 No or negligible relationship 
-.20 to -.29 Weak negative relationship 
-.30 to -.39 Moderate negative relationship 
-.40 to -.69 Strong negative relationship  
-.70 or higher Very strong negative relationship 
 
 Community-based 
Trainer (CBT) 
Village Agent (VA) Field Agent (FA) Private Service 
Provider (PSP) 
CARE or CRS model CARE CARE CRS CRS 
Agent paid under 
an active project  Yes No Yes No 
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 Agent-formed Self-formed 
Origin of idea 
to form or 
transition to a 
VSLA/SILC 
Agent Future group members or other non-agent 
source (e.g. neighboring group, radio 
advertisement, etc.) 
Example 1 Agent Y just completed PSP certification and is 
ready to begin forming people into SILC groups 
for a small fee. Agent Y stands at the front of 
her church after Sunday service and tells the 
congregation about SILC groups, encouraging 
them to contact her for training on how to 
form such a group. After the service, she is 
contacted by a few members of the 
congregation, who ask her if she can help them 
form Group A. Agent Y agrees and helps the 
group get started. Group A is an Agent-formed 
group, regardless of whether the group 
members ultimately paid for the agent’s 
services. 
Person A walks by Group B on a day when 
Group B is holding its share-out. Person A is 
encouraged by the success of Group B and 
gathers a few of his friends to form Group C. 
Person A and his friends recruit new members, 
and Group C grows. Group C is classified as a 
Self-Formed group regardless of whether the 
group it learned from (Group B) was Self-
Formed or Agent-Formed. If Group C later 
decided to hire an agent to provide training, 
this would not change its classification as a 
self-formed group.  
Party 
responsible 
for organizing 
members into 
a group 
Agent Future group members, likely a small group of 
founding members 
Example 2 Agent Z is a VA who is a member of another 
VSLA group, but wants to form a new group 
that will hopefully pay him for training. He 
goes door-to-door in his village, encouraging 
people to join Group D. He gathers the first 
few members of Group D together and 
provides the group with initial training in the 
VSLA model. As word of Group D spreads, the 
group’s membership grows. Group D is an 
Agent-Formed group, regardless of whether 
the group members ultimately pay Agent Z for 
his service. 
See Example 1. 
Was the group 
trained? 
Yes Maybe 
Who provided 
the training? 
Agent Agent, community member, government 
employee, or member of another group 
Example 3 See Example 2. Person B heard a government-sponsored radio 
program encouraging people to form SILC or 
VSLA groups. She and a few friends formed 
Group E and started saving and giving loans. 
After they formed the group, a PSP or VA 
stopped by to offer the group training. They 
accepted, and they added a formal 
constitution with new rules that helped the 
group operate more effectively. Group E is a 
Self-Formed group. 
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Treatment of focus groups outside a sample village: Five of 46 focus group discussions were 
held with replicated groups located outside the village where the sample project group was 
located. Groups located outside a sample village were not counted in replication estimates. 
Data collected from these groups were included, however, in the discussions of replicated 
groups’ experiences and performance found in Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Treatment of disbanded groups: Four of the 20 sample project groups had disbanded at the time 
of this research. However, researchers administered surveys to committee members of each of the 
four groups. All of the groups were CRS groups, and three of these began in January of 2009.34 
Two of the four groups had relatively high default rates of 24% and 33%, which may have 
contributed to their collapse. Below are some summary statistics on the four disbanded groups.
Disbanded 
Group Name 
Member-
ship in 
beginning 
% 
female 
% 
members 
in other 
groups 
Social 
Fund 
Consti-
tution 
Changes 
to rules 
Did group 
use 
ledgers, 
passbooks, 
and/or a 
cashbox? 
Did group 
keep 
funds 
outside 
the 
cashbox? 
Kasanzi SILC 
Group  13 61.54% 100.00% Yes Yes no 
ledger 
cashbox no 
Kendahi 
Thukolere-
haguma  30 80.00% 66.67% Yes Yes no 
ledger 
passbook no 
Kweterane SILC 
Group  30 73.33% 100.00% Yes Yes yes 
ledger 
passbook yes 
St. Matia 
Mulumba  10 30.00% 0.00% Yes Yes no 
ledger 
passbook yes 
 
Disbanded Group 
Name District 
Village 
Name 
Village 
Population 
Founding 
Date 
Years in 
Existence Facilitat-
ing 
Agency 
Partner 
Org. 
No. of 
Criteria 
Met by 
Group 
Kasanzi SILC 
Group  Bundibugyo Kasanzi I 100 Jan-09 
4.456 
CRS 
Self 
Care 12 
Kendahi 
Thukolerehaguma  Kasese Kendahi 105 Jan-09 
4.464 
CRS KWGS 11 
Kweterane SILC 
Group  Kasese 
Hima/Lower 
Mowlem 555 Jan-09 
4.464 
CRS KWGS 13 
St. Matia 
Mulumba  Kasese Ibanda 1 1000 Apr-07 
6.247 
CRS KWGS 11 
 
3 4 
The formation date for St. Matia 
Mulumba group, Apr-07, was 
provided by the group, but is 
inconsistent with project records, 
which indicate operations began 
in 2008.
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Disbanded 
Group 
Name 
How often 
the group 
met in the 
beginning? 
Value of 
first 
share-
out 
Did group 
own 
property at 
the end of 
the first 
cycle? 
Interest 
rate in 
beginn-
ing 
Amount 
receiving 
loans 
Loan 
Interest 
Rate 
Size of 
most 
common 
loan 
(UGX) 
When 
must 
loans be 
repaid? 
Kasanzi 
SILC Group  weekly 3500000 yes 10 all 10 
 75,000 - 
149,999  3 mo 
Kendahi 
Thukolere-
haguma  weekly 927200 yes 10 all 10 
150,000 
- 
250,000 3 mo 
Kweterane 
SILC Group  weekly 5500000 yes 10 all 10 
150,000 
- 
250,000 3 mo 
St. Matia 
Mulumba  weekly 900000 yes 10 all 10 
>250,00
0 3 mo 
 
Disbanded Group 
Name 
Outstanding 
loans (UGX) 
% of loans 
not repaid 
Savings-to- 
loan ratio? 
Group 
property 
today? 
Value of last 
share-out (UGX) 
Min. 
savings 
Kasanzi SILC Group  0 0% yes yes 3500000 1000 
Kendahi 
Thukolerehaguma  350500 33% yes no 1000000 500 
Kweterane SILC 
Group  400000 24% yes yes 4400000 1500 
St. Matia Mulumba  0 0% no no 1200000 1000 
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SECTiOn APPEnDiCES
Section 1, Appendix 1: Replication Correlation Results
35 four rows containing blank cells excluded from correlation.
36 Correlation excludes disbanded groups.
37 Correlation excludes disbanded groups.
  
Replication per 
project group w/in 
sample village 
% Founding members who left active in 
other groups -0.03 
Years in operation 0.08 
Membership in beginning 0.24 
Membership in beginning - female 0.09 
Membership- % female in beginning -0.02 
How many members are still active in the 
group? -0.04 
% founding members still active -0.11 
Founding members who left who are now 
active in other groups -0.08 
Value of first share-out 0.24 
Value of most recent share-out 0.03 
% growth in share-out -0.15 
Total # of rule changes -0.05 
No. meetings per year now 0.01 
Current membership 0.00 
Current membership - female 0.00 
Current membership- % female 0.00 
Average age of members 0.06 
Repay periods (months) 0.17 
% members receiving loans last cycle 0.12 
% loans not repaid last cycle 0.10 
Minimum weekly savings (both CARE and 
CRS) 0.35 
% of members in other groups 0.44 
Saturation  -0.11 
Distance to urban area 0.04 
 
35
36
37
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Section 3, Appendix 1: Performance Statistics across Group Type
Analysis Total Project 
Replicated 
(w/Influenced) 
Replicated (w/o 
Influenced) 
Agent-
formed 
Self-
formed 
Influe-
nced 
% of loan not repaid at the end of the cycle  
Average 5.7 4.5 6.3 7.3 7.0 7.6 0.2 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 50 33 50 50 38 50 1 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard deviation 11.15 8.89 12.15 12.88 13.65 12.62 0.41 
Total groups 
defaulting 23 7 15 15 5 9 1 
Total groups 
(excluding those with 
no data) 61 20 41 40 15 20 6 
% Groups w/ loan 
defaults 37.7% 35.0% 32.6% 37.5% 33.3% 36.0% 16.7% 
 
Analysis Total Project 
Replicated 
(w/Influenced) 
Replicated 
(w/o 
Influenced) 
Agent-
formed 
Self-
formed 
Influe-
nced 
Return on savings 
Average 33.6% 30.4% 35.2% 36.1% 30.0% 41.4% 31.0% 
Median 30.7% 30.0% 31.6% 31.6% 27.1% 34.2% 31.5% 
Max 87.5% 87.5% 87.2% 87.2% 52.4% 87.2% 56.1% 
Min 4.8% 5.5% 4.8% 17.0% 
17.0 
% 17.9% 4.8% 
Standard deviation 21.4% 20.4% 22.0% 22.6% 15.6% 26.2% 17.6% 
No data (# groups) 18 4 14 14 3 11 0 
Total groups  62 20 46 40 15 25 6 
 
Analysis Total Project 
Replicated 
(w/Influenced) 
Replicated 
(w/o 
Influenced) 
Agent-
formed 
Self-
formed Influenced 
Share-out size (first share-out) in UGX 
Average 
                    
3,256,106 
                                
3,539,903 
                       
3,114,208 
                              
3,217,129  
          
3,681,720  
              
2,850,347  
              
2,530,983  
Median 
                    
2,750,000  
                                
3,500,000  
                       
2,450,000  
                              
2,750,000  
          
4,000,000  
              
2,400,000  
                 
700,000  
Max 
                 
11,000,000  
                                
8,000,000  
                     
11,000,000  
                              
7,500,000  
          
7,500,000  
              
7,000,000  
           
11,000,000  
Min 
                          
85,900.00  
                                   
900,000  
                          
85,900  
                               
150,000  
         
980,000  
                 
150,000  
                    
85,900  
Standard 
deviation 
                    
2,306,719  
                                
1,859,638 
                       
2,510,559 
                              
2,159,055 
          
1,943,729 
              
2,299,073 
              
4,232,780  
No data (# 
groups)  6 0 6 6 0 6 0 
Total 
Groups  62 20 46 40 15 25 6 
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Loan Size Breakdown Key:
Section 3, Appendix 2: Performance Correlation Results
Analysis Total Project 
Replicated 
(w/Influenced) 
Replicated 
(w/o 
Influenced) 
Agent-
formed 
Self-
formed 
Influe-
nced 
Loan size (>250,000 counted as 250,000) in UGX *(see breakdown key below) 
Average 
                     
3.44  
                            
3.55  
                           
3.39  
                         
3.35  
                    
3.53  
             
3.24  
          
3.67  
Median 
                     
4.00  
                            
4.00  
                           
3.00  
                         
3.00  
                    
4.00  
             
3.00  
          
4.00  
Max 
                     
5.00  
                            
5.00  
                           
5.00  
                         
5.00  
                    
5.00  
             
5.00  
          
4.00  
Min 
                     
1.00  
                            
2.00  
                           
1.00  
                         
1.00  
                    
2.00  
             
1.00  
          
3.00  
Standard 
deviation 
                     
1.01  
                            
0.83  
                           
1.08  
                         
1.14  
                    
1.06  
             
1.20  
          
0.52  
Total groups 66 20 46 40 15 25 6 
 
Loan Size Designation 
>250,000 5 
150,000 - 250,000 4 
 75,000 - 149,999  3 
15,000 - 74,999 2 
<15,000 1 
 
 
All Groups (with disbanded)
Value 
of first 
share 
out
Interest 
rate in 
beginni
ng loan_ir
Outsta
nding 
loans
% of 
loans 
not 
repaid
Group 
Age
Return 
on 
Saving
s
Total 
Saving
s (inc. 
membe
rship 
fees)
Min 
Weekly 
Saving
s
% of 
Men in 
Groups
Averag
e 
Weekly 
Saving
s (Calc)
# of 
Rule 
Chang
es
% of 
Membe
rs in 
Other 
Groups
Criteria 
Met
Value of first share out 1.00
Interest rate in beginning 0.05 1.00
loan_ir -0.23 0.72 1.00
Outstanding loans 0.55 -0.02 -0.26 1.00
% of loans not repaid -0.12 0.08 0.17 -0.10 1.00
Group Age 0.09 -0.10 -0.15 0.09 -0.10 1.00
Return on Savings 0.03 0.11 -0.04 0.15 -0.01 0.05 1.00
Total Savings (inc. 
membership fees) 0.49 -0.10 -0.27 0.60 -0.21 0.07 -0.31 1.00
Min Weekly Savings 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.09 -0.19 0.06 -0.02 1.00
% of Men in Groups -0.01 -0.16 -0.15 0.26 0.00 -0.17 0.19 0.22 0.13 1.00
Average Weekly Savings 
(Calc) 0.50 -0.09 -0.34 0.53 -0.21 0.05 -0.26 0.95 0.04 0.20 1.00
# of Rule Changes 0.04 -0.24 -0.13 0.21 -0.05 0.14 0.04 0.17 -0.10 -0.07 0.16 1.00
% of Members in Other 
Groups -0.01 -0.07 -0.20 -0.05 -0.22 0.08 0.14 -0.28 -0.09 -0.07 -0.16 -0.03 1.00
Criteria Met 0.31 -0.13 -0.33 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.17 -0.02 0.08 -0.14 -0.16 1.00
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All Groups (without 
disbanded)
Value 
of first 
share 
out
Interest 
rate in 
beginni
ng loan_ir
Outsta
nding 
loans
% of 
loans 
not 
repaid
Group 
Age
Return 
on 
Saving
s
Total 
Saving
s (inc. 
membe
rship 
fees)
Min 
Weekly 
Saving
s
% of 
Men in 
Groups
Averag
e 
Weekly 
Saving
s (Calc)
# of 
Rule 
Chang
es
% of 
Membe
rs in 
Other 
Groups
Criteria 
Met
Value of first share out 1.00
Interest rate in beginning 0.05 1.00
loan_ir -0.23 0.72 1.00
Outstanding loans 0.56 -0.01 -0.25 1.00
% of loans not repaid -0.12 0.07 0.16 -0.08 1.00
Group Age 0.14 -0.15 -0.21 0.18 -0.21 1.00
Return on Savings 0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.15 -0.04 0.04 1.00
Total Savings (inc. 
membership fees) 0.48 -0.09 -0.26 0.60 -0.17 0.10 -0.31 1.00
Min Weekly Savings 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.11 -0.21 0.07 -0.04 1.00
% of Men in Groups -0.01 -0.16 -0.15 0.26 0.00 -0.17 0.19 0.22 0.13 1.00
Average Weekly Savings 
(Calc) 0.49 -0.08 -0.33 0.52 -0.17 0.08 -0.25 0.95 0.03 0.20 1.00
# of Rule Changes 0.03 -0.22 -0.11 0.17 0.01 0.28 0.05 0.14 -0.11 -0.07 0.14 1.00
% of Members in Other 
Groups -0.01 -0.07 -0.20 -0.05 -0.24 0.08 0.14 -0.28 -0.08 -0.07 -0.16 -0.02 1.00
Criteria Met 0.29 -0.13 -0.33 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.16 -0.02 0.07 -0.16 -0.16 1.00
 
Project Groups (with 
disbanded)
Value 
of first 
share 
out
Interes
t rate 
in 
begin
ning
loan_i
r
Outsta
nding 
loans
% of 
loans 
not 
repaid
Group 
Age
Return 
on 
Saving
s
Total 
Saving
s (inc. 
memb
ership 
fees)
Min 
Weekl
y 
Saving
s
% of 
Men 
in 
Group
s
Avera
ge 
Weekl
y 
Saving
s 
# of 
Rule 
Chang
es
% of 
Memb
ers in 
Other 
Group
s
Criteri
a Met
Value of first share out 1.00
Interest rate in beginning 0.13 1.00
loan_ir -0.15 0.44 1.00
Outstanding loans 0.50 0.10 -0.47 1.00
% of loans not repaid -0.17 0.22 0.24 -0.23 1.00
Group Age -0.10 0.21 -0.02 -0.04 0.25 1.00
Return on Savings 0.62 0.22 -0.17 0.75 0.16 0.26 1.00
Total Savings (inc. membership fees)-0.14 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.22 -0.17 -0.27 1.00
Min Weekly Savings 0.62 -0.06 -0.42 0.67 -0.05 0.25 0.69 0.10 1.00
% of Men in Groups -0.05 0.04 -0.25 0.29 0.19 -0.19 0.08 0.29 0.27 1.00
Average Weekly Savings (Calc) -0.13 -0.15 -0.08 -0.10 -0.24 -0.18 -0.26 1.00 0.12 0.30 1.00
# of Rule Changes -0.05 -0.28 -0.17 0.11 -0.17 -0.25 0.14 0.31 -0.04 0.00 0.30 1.00
% of Members in Other Groups 0.14 0.12 -0.34 0.29 -0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.52 0.14 -0.04 -0.50 -0.24 1.00
Criteria Met 0.23 -0.54 -0.47 0.38 -0.26 -0.24 0.00 0.02 0.31 0.37 0.03 0.08 0.20 1.00
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Section 4, Appendix 1: Asset Sales Cross-Tabulation Results
Section 4, Appendix 2: Rule Change Cross-Tabulation Results39
38 Outliers removed.
39 Outliers removed from growth rate calculations.
 
Replicated (with Influenced)
Value 
of First 
Share-
out
Interest 
rate 
(begin
ning)
Interest 
Rate 
(curren
t)
Outsta
nding 
loans
% of 
Loans 
Not 
Repaid 
(Defaul
t Rate)
Group 
Age
Return 
on 
Saving
s
Total 
Saving
s (inc. 
membe
rship 
fees)
Min 
Weekly 
Saving
s
% of 
Men in 
Groups
Averag
e 
Weekly 
Saving
s (Calc)
# of 
Rule 
Chang
es
% of 
Membe
rs in 
Other 
Groups
Criteria 
Met
Value of first share out 1.00
Interest rate in beginning 0.02 1.00
loan_ir -0.24 0.82 1.00
Outstanding loans 0.57 -0.05 -0.19 1.00
% of loans not repaid -0.09 0.07 0.14 -0.06 1.00
Group Age 0.02 -0.33 -0.15 0.13 -0.26 1.00
Return on Savings -0.17 0.11 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 0.09 1.00
Total Savings (inc. membership 
fees) 0.65 -0.11 -0.30 0.82 -0.19 -0.01 -0.31 1.00
Min Weekly Savings -0.01 0.15 0.13 -0.09 0.12 -0.31 -0.06 -0.05 1.00
% of Men in Groups 0.04 -0.18 -0.15 0.28 -0.04 -0.06 0.23 0.25 0.11 1.00
Average Weekly Savings (Calc) 0.66 -0.11 -0.40 0.72 -0.19 -0.08 -0.23 0.94 0.03 0.21 1.00
# of Rule Changes 0.08 -0.25 -0.12 0.26 -0.01 0.49 -0.03 0.13 -0.13 -0.08 0.13 1.00
% of Members in Other Groups -0.04 -0.10 -0.16 -0.15 -0.28 0.21 0.19 -0.18 -0.13 -0.10 -0.01 0.07 1.00
Criteria Met 0.29 -0.13 -0.30 -0.16 0.04 -0.21 0.07 -0.09 0.18 -0.02 0.00 -0.22 -0.23 1.00
All groups(without disbanded or groups that 
had not yet completed a cycle) Group Age 
Default rate -0.21 
 
Did someone in the 
group sell and asset? 
Average 
first share-
out (UGX) 
Average last 
share-out 
(UGX) 
Average 
share-out 
growth rate Average default rate 
Yes 2485000 2893473 8% 3.6% 
No 2871161 5037408  57% 6.3% 
 
Group has made changes 
Average 
return 
on 
savings 
Average 
share-
out 
growth 
rate 
Average default 
rate 
Average 
first- 
share-
out 
(UGX) 
No 28.3% 43.5% 4.0%  2894437 
Yes 37.1% 471.4% 5.2% 3018249 
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Changes made to min/max saving 
Average return 
on savings 
Average share-out 
growth rate 
Average 
default rate 
Average first- 
share-out 
(UGX) 
No 34.4% 43.2% 5.5% 3172107 
Yes 31.4% 54.2%  4.7% 2297556 
 
Changes made to interest rate 
Average return 
on savings 
Average share-
out growth rate 
Average 
default rate 
Average first- 
share-out 
(UGX) 
No 33.2% 38.7% 5.1% 2752328 
Yes 35.1% 85.3% 6.2% 4123590 
 
Changes made to 
social fund policy 
Average return 
on savings 
Average 
share-out 
growth rate 
Average 
default rate 
Average first- 
share-out 
(UGX) 
No 32.9% 356.0% 5.8% 2921521 
Yes 39.2% 110.4% 0.3% 3345833 
 
Changes made to types of position in 
management committee 
Average return 
on savings 
Average 
share-out 
growth rate 
Average 
default rate 
Average first- 
share-out 
(UGX) 
No 33.8% 36.4% 5.3% 2843004 
Yes 30.2% 110.4%  5.0% 4775000 
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Changes made to membership size 
Average return 
on savings 
Average 
share-out 
growth rate 
Average 
default rate 
Average first- 
share-out 
(UGX) 
No 33.7% 46.4% 5.1% 2976695 
Yes 28.6% 32.2% 10.0% 2428900 
 
Changes made to loan policies 
Average return 
on savings 
Average 
share-out 
growth rate 
Average 
default rate 
Average first- 
share-out 
(UGX) 
No 34.3% 341.3% 5.0% 2963835 
Yes 29.5% 244.8% 7.9% 2928571 
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